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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

2 10 a process server visited the deIn 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier,
fendants' apartment twice, but failed to personally serve them. He then
resorted to RPAPL 735's alternative method of service. Since the requirements of this section had been complied with, a judgment for
possession was granted. However, the judgment did not include accrued
rent, since the place of service requirements of CPLR 308(4) had not
been met. 211 The court emphasized that, as to the places where service
is to be made under CPLR 308(4) and RPAPL 735, there is "a difference of substance, not a mere semantical distinction."2 12 It noted: "The
former requirement is calculated to acquire jurisdiction of the person;
the latter seeks only jurisdiction of the res."21 3

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACICE

Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law
Introduction
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,1 the New York Court of Appeals
recently recognized the right of one charged solely with active negligence to obtain indemnification from other persons sharing responsibility for the plaintiff's damages. Liability is now to be apportioned among
the several tortfeasors, on the basis of the "relative responsibility" of
each. 2 Prior to Dole, the right to indemnification was limited to situations where a passive tortfeasor sought recovery over from an active
tortfeasor. Additionally, CPLR 1401 allowed contribution where a joint
tortfeasor paid more than his pro rata share of a joint judgment.
The following example illustrates the operation of this rule of
apportionment. X, while on the premises of Y!, was injured due to a
dangerous condition created by the negligence of Z. Y, who was aware
of the danger, permitted X to enter the premises anyway. Prior to Dole,
if Y were sued individually, he would bear the entire loss, with no recourse against Z for X's injuries.3 However, Dole vests in Y! the right
either to implead Z or to institute a separate action against Z, and thus
be indemnified for that portion of the plaintiff's recovery attributable
to Z's negligence.
21068 Misc. 2d 793, 328 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1971).
211 Id. at 795, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
212 Id.
213 Id.
1 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
2 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at

288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1972).
295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
3"[Flailure to act after actual knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition

...

spells out active negligence." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Costanzi, 140

N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955).
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Importantly, the Dole case is a strong indication of judicial dissatisfaction with the doctrine of contributory negligence, which requires that a plaintiff be completely free from fault in order to recover 4
The adoption of comparative negligence among defendants is part
of a trend toward the adoption of full comparative negligence in New
York.
HistoricalBackground
An understanding of the concepts of contribution and indemnity
is necessary to appreciate fully the impact of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
These concepts are based on "equitable considerations of unjust enrichment and restitution." 5 Contribution involves an equal sharing of
liability between two or more persons who jointly cause damage. Each
wrongdoer is required to pay his pro rata share in a distribution of the
loss among all tortfeasors. 6 Indemnity involves a total shifting of liability
from one tortfeasor to another who should bear the entire liability imposed.7 Indemnity arises by operation of law where one party is primarily responsible for the injury,8 and contribution applies in those
instances where the parties are in pari delicto.9
Merryweather v. Nixan,10 is the progenitor of the rule denying
contribution between joint tortfeasors.1 A joint judgment had been
4 See Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 134, 169 NE. 112, 115 (1929).

5 Note, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CAIjF. L. REv. 490, 491 (1969)
[hereinafter Contribution and Indemnity in California].
6 See W. PRossER, THE LAW or TORTS 310 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PRossER]; Leflar,

Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932) [hereinafter
Leflar].
7 See PRossER, supra note 6, at 310; Leflar, supra note 6, at 131.
There are two important practical distinctions between indemnity and contribution. In the case of indemnity there is a complete reimbursement; contribution
among joint tort-feasors is on a pro rata basis. Second, in an indemnity situation,
impleader and cross-claims are appropriate whereas the contrary is true in the
case of contribution.
2A WK&M 1 1401.03.
8 See PRossmt 810-13; Leflar at 146.
9 See 2A WK&M
1401.03. The determination as to which remedy -indemnity or
contribution-is appropriate is difficult in certain situations.
[omhe line between indemnity and contribution has become blurred when there is
some element of fault on the part of both defendants but the distribution of fault
is disproportionate, such as in cases involving tortfeasors one of whom is guilty
of "active" negligence and the other only of "passive" negligence.
Id.
10 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
11 Merryweather has been criticized so extensively and so many exceptions have
evolved that one commentator concluded:
It is singularly unfortunate, and has led to misunderstanding, that Merryweather
v. Nixan should have been continually treated as stating the "general rule." As a
matter of fact that case states not the rule, but the exception.
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence- Merryweather
v. Nixan, 12 HAttv. L. Rzv. 176, 177 (1898) [hereinafter Contribution- Merryweather v.
Nixan]. See also RESATEmENT oF REsTrruTiON, Introductory Note §§ 86-102 (1937).
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entered against two defendants and had been satisfied by one, who
sought contribution from the other. Due to the lack of judicial precedent for allowing contribution, Chief Justice Kenyon held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover. An essential element of Merryweather was the fact that the conduct of the parties was intentional and
concerted. 12 It has been argued that the rule espoused should not be
taken beyond the context of those particular facts. 13 In refusing to
award contribution, the Merryweatherecourtcompletely abrogated the
more fundamental right that losses should be distributed among those
whose conduct was the source of wrongdoing. 14
Later English cases clarified the rule, holding it inapplicable in
situations of "mere vicarious liability, negligence, accident, mistake, or
other unintentional breaches of the law."' 5 When the rule against contribution was adopted in the United States, it was applied initially only
to intentional or wilful conduct. 6 Eventually, the courts extended the
rule to cases involving negligent tortfeasors.17
Justification for the rule against contribution is primarily explained in terms of deterrence to wrongful actions and punishment for
misconduct.' 8 Adhering to the "unclean hands" doctrine, courts avoided
12 See PROSSER

305; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21
L.Q. 552, 555 (1936) [hereinafter Bohlen]; Leflar at 130. The judgment was for
damage to a reversionary interest in a mill and for trover to machinery.
The ground of the decision would appear to have been simply the fact that the
parties had acted intentionally and in concert, and the plaintiff's claim for contribution rested upon what was, in the eyes of the law, entirely his own deliberate
wrong.
PROSSER 305.
13 See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 12, at 550-60; Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent
Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IoWA L. REv. 517, 537 (1952) [hereinafter Davis];
Leflar at 140-46; Contribution-Merryweather v. Nixan, supra note 11, at 180; Note,
Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUm. L. Rav. 123,
124 (1965) [hereinafter A Workable Rule of Contribution].
Today Lord Kenyon's decision seems highly unfortunate. The profession ... [has]
come to realize that the primary if not the sole function of a tort action is to
place the burden of bearing the loss caused by tortious conduct upon those who
should bear it.
Bohlen at 556.
14 See Keeton, Comment on Maid v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 906, 913 (1968).
15 PRossER 306. See Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown S.S. Co., [1894] A.C. 318 (Scot.);
Burrows v. Rhodes, 1 Q.B. 816 (1899); Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827);
1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THe LAw oF TORTS 715 (1956) [hereinafter HARPER & JAmEs].
England abolished the Merryweather rule by the Law Reform (Married Women and
Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 6.
16 PRossEa 306, citing Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248 (1857); Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige 18
(N.Y. 1844); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. 1816); Rhea v. White, 3 Head 121 (Tenn.
1859); Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78 (1870).
17 See 1 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 15, at 715; Davis, supra note 13, at 517; Contribution and Indemnity in California, supra note 5, at 494. This blanket application took
place in the twentieth century.
18 See Bohlen at 557; Leflar at 133; A Workable Rule of Contribution,supra note 13,
CORNELL
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"disputes about transactions which flout[ed] the very law which the
courts [were] asked to administer."' 9 While this policy may be valid insofar as wilful wrongs are concerned, its viability is highly questionable
insofar as it purports to deter negligence. 20 While a fundamental aspect
of our law involves a "refusal to aid wrongdoers," distribution of losses
among wrongdoers in accordance with a policy against allowing a
,rongdoer to escape responsibility is equally compelling. 2 ' Additionally, the common-law rule against contribution can be criticized for its
delegation to plaintiffs of an absolute right to select their defendants.m
Fortunately, most jurisdictions have altered the common-law rule,
through statute or decisional law, and there is increasing support for
2
free allocation of losses among all wrongdoers. 3
Due to strict application of the rule denying contribution, a means
was developed to shift the entire liability from one person to another
where the qualities of negligence differed- indemnity. 21 It is clear
that the constant disallowance of contribution caused indemnity to
be "overextended as a device for reallocating loss"' 25 and applied where
contribution would have been the more appropriate remedy.2 One
author has divided indemnity cases into three categories. The "liability
without fault" category encompasses cases where liability results from
at 124; Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68
YALE L.J. 964 n.1 (1959).
The reason why the law refused its aid to enforce contribution amongst wrongdoers, is that they may be intimidated from committing the wrong, by the danger
of each being made responsible for all the consequences; a reason, which does not
apply to torts or injuries arising from mistakes or accidents, or involuntary
onssions in the discharge of official duties.

Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 1 Rand. 328, 333 (Va. 1823).

19 Leflar at 134. See Bohlen at 557; A Workable Rule of Contribution at 124.

20 See Bohlen at 557-59; Leflar at 134.
21 See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 463, 480

(1962) [hereinafter Creative Continuity]. In actuality, refusing contribution to joint tortfeasors may encourage wrongdoing. Habitual wrongdoers might be willing to take the
risk of being completely liable against the possibility of avoiding all liability.
22 See Bohlen at 553; Leflar at 137; A Workable Rule of Contribution at 125. In
Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn Rys., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924), the plaintiff
brought an action for contribution after a joint judgment had been rendered against him
and a third party. The defendant, who owned stock of the third party, became assignee
of all the claims and proceeded to enforce the claims against the plaintiff only.
23 For the most comprehensive listing of the alterations of the common-law rule by
the states, see Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision
Cases, 68 Ymxta L.J. 964, 981-84 (1959), which is divided into three general sections: (1)
where contribution is allowed and under what conditions; (2) where idemnity is permissible and under what circumstances; and (3) where indemnity is permitted and denied
in collision cases.
24 See A Workable Rule of Contribution at 126.
25 Id.
26 See Bohlen at 568. In Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951), Judge
Learned Hand stated: "Indemnity is only an extreme form of contribution."
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imputation of law, e.g., respondeat superior cases, and the "liability
with negligible fault" category includes cases where there is a nondelegable duty, e.g., a failure to remedy a danger caused by another.
The third category, "liability with lesser fault," encompasses cases
predicated on the fault of both parties, but allows a shifting of the
entire loss on the basis of varying degrees of culpability.27 The concept
of indemnity is more readily understandable in this light.
The Development of Contribution and Indemnity in New York
The issue of contribution first arose in New York in 1816. In Peck
v. Ellis,28 the Merryweather rule was adopted as contribution was denied to one of two joint tortfeasors who had fraudulently induced his
victim into illegally cutting and carrying off timber. Chancellor Kent
expressed doubt that equity would aid one tortfeasor against another if
their liability was equal and concluded that it certainly would not do
so when the party seeking its aid was personally guilty and the other
29
was only technically or constructively so.
Peck did not deviate from Merryweatherin its holding, as the tort
in question was wilfully committed. Subsequent decisions also applied
the rule only to those offenses intentionally perpetrated,3 0 thus paralleling the development of the Merryweather rule in England.8 ' In
1861, however, the rule against contribution was extended to include
conduct which was merely negligent rather than intentional, 2 and
this addition to the common-law rule became fixed in New York law.
The expanded Merryweather rule remained settled law in New
27 Contribution and Indemnity in California at 494-99.
28 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. 1816).
29Id. at 136. The Court recognized that both parties were guilty of fraud but that
there was all possible difference in the demerit of each, and in the nature and
degree of the fraud imputable to both. The fraud in Rowland was legal or constructive fraud; but in Ellis it was actual fraud....

Id. at 135. This distinction was gratuitously drawn as the constructively guilty party was
not seeking recovery through contribution. He did, however, obtain an express contract
of indemnity with the actually guilty party to guard against the consequences of any
possible fraud. The Chancellor's statement can be read as sowing the seeds of the concept
of the relative degree of liability between joint tortfeasors as a proper consideration in the
granting
of indemnification.
3
0See Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige 18 (N.Y. 1844) (intentional fraud); Pierson v.
Thompson, 1 Edw. Ch. 212 (N.Y. Vice-Ch. Ct. 1831) (knowing trespass).
31 See, e.g., Betts v. Gibbons, IlI Eng. Rep. 22 (K.B. 1833); Adamson v. Jarvis, 130
Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827). These cases restated the rule as applicable only to intentional
conduct.
s2 Andrews v. Murray, 33 Barb. 354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861). The court apparently misread an earlier English case, Pearson v. Skelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533 (Ex. 1836), which it
cited in support of this extension. Pearson was indeed a negligence case, but the court
therein had clearly limited the application of Merryweather to intentionally committed
wrongs.
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York until its statutory modification in 1928. In an effort to ameliorate
the harsh effects of the rule,83 the Legislature enacted section 211-a of the
Civil Practice Act, 34 which provided a limited right of contribution

between joint tortfeasors and prescribed procedural methods for obtaining such relief. A defendant could proceed immediately against a codefendant or institute a separate action later. Two prerequisites were
required under the statute: (1) a joint judgment against two or more
parties, and (2) the discharge by one of more than his pro rata share of
the judgment.3 5
The possibility of contribution was thus wholly dependent upon
the plaintiff's inclusion of other joint tortfeasors in the action.3 6 Attempts to circumvent this requirement soon focused on the impleader
provisions of section 193(2) of the CPA. 7 If other co-tortfeasors could
33 See Epstein v. National Transp. Co., 287 N.Y. 456, 458, 40 N.E.2d 632 (1942); Note,
Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 276 (1950).
While the rule applied only to parties who were actually in pari delicto (see Security
Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Ice Co., 268 App. Div. 924, 51 N.Y.S.2d 299 (2d Dep't 1944)
(mem.)), as opposed to those whose "misconduct" was technical or constructive, the extension of the rule to encompass negligently committed torts opened the gates to harsh,
inequitable decisions. See N.Y. LAw RnsIoN COMM'N RE,. 707 (1936) [hereinafter 1936
REP.]. England abolished the rule in 1935. See note 15 supra.
34The New York statute, CPA 211-a, added by L. 1928, ch. 714, read:
Action by one joint tort-feasor against another. Where a money judgment has
been recovered jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal
injury or for property damage, and such judgment had been paid in part or in
full by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than
his own pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other defendants
with respect to the excess so paid over and above the pro rata share of the
defendant or defendants making such payments; provided, however, that no
defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other such defendant an amount
greater than his pro rata share of the entire judgment. Such recovery may be had
in a separate action; or where the parties have appeared in the original action, a
judgment may be entered by one such defendant against the other by motion on
notice.
For an excellent treatment of CPA 211-a, see Note, Contribution Between Joint
Tortfeasors, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 276 (1950).
35 See Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 454, 158 N.E.2d 691, 695, 186 N.Y.S.2d
15, 20 (1959); Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 808, 178 N.E. 289, 290
(1931).
36 The New York courts consistently nullified attempts by defendants to insure joint
judgments by denying the availability of various appellate remedies. See Ward v. Iroquois
Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932) (defendant who had not paid joint judgment
had no standing to contest reversal of judgment as to co-defendant); Price v. Ryan, 255
N.Y. 16, 173 N.E. 907 (1930) (defendant had no standing to appeal from a verdict in favor
of co-defendant). A defendant also had no standing to move to have a verdict in favor
of a co-defendant set aside. See Hughes v. Parkhurst, 284 App. Div. 757, 184 N.Y.S.2d 798
(4th Dep't 1954). CPLR 1402(a), a codification of Epstein v. National Transp. Co., 287
N.Y. 456, 40 N.E.2d 632 (1942), allows a tortfeasor who has paid a joint judgment to
oppose an appeal taken by a co-defendant and to prosecute an appeal from any reversal or
modification. See 2A WK&M 1402.08. In light of Dole, the continued validity of the rule
denying a tortfeasor standing to appeal a dismissal as to a co-defendant is doubtful.
87 Prior to 1946, section 193(2) of the CPA provided:
Where any party to an action shows another party or parties thereto is or are, or
will be, liable to such moving party wholly or in part for the claim made against
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191

be impleaded into the action by the defendant, the risk of relying on

the plaintiff's choice of election could be eliminated.a8 This avenue of
such moving party in the action, the court, on application of such moving party,
may order a pleading alleging the claim of such moving party against such other
party or parties to be served upon such other party or parties and that such
other party or parties plead thereto, so that the claim of such moving party
against such other party or parties may be determined in such action, which
shall thereupon proceed against such other party or parties as a defendant or
defendants therein to such judgment as may be proper.
Third-party practice in New York originated in 1922 with the passage of a statute
which, as amended in 1923, was contained in section 193(2) of the CPA. The statute
closely patterned English impleader practice, as authorized by Order XVI of the Rules
of the Supreme Court (1875), in an effort to eliminate the time, expense, and repetition
of multiple litigation. See Baxter v. France, 1 Q.B. 59 (1895).
Section 193(2) was unsatisfactory for several reasons: (1) leave of the court was
required for the defendant to implead; (2) the plaintiff was allowed to object to the
impleader before and after the inclusion of a third party; (3) impleader was only permitted
if the third party was or would be liable to the defendant, causing the courts to be
illiberal by requiring identity of claims; and (4) the third party could not interpose
defenses against the main plaintiff's claim. See 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 1007, commentary at
334-35 (1963).
Correcting these defects, the Legislature in 1946 re-enacted the statute as section 193-a
of the CPA, which provided in part:
After the service of his answer, a defendant may bring in a person not a party to
the action, who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him, by serving upon such person a summons and copy of a verified
complaint. The claim against such person, hereinafter called the third-party
defendant, must be related to the main action by a question of law or fact
common to both controversies, but need not rest upon the same cause of action
or the same ground as the claim asserted against the third-party plaintiff.
CPLR 1007, the present counterpart of CPA 193-a, remained largely unchanged from
its predecessor. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1007, commentary at 333 (1963). CPLE. 1007
reads as follows:
When third-party practice allowed. After the service of his answer, a defendant
may proceed against a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him, by serving upon such person a summons
and third-party complaint and all prior pleadings served in the action. A defendant serving a third-party complaint shall be styled a third-party plaintiff
and the person so served shall be styled a third-party defendant. The defendant
shall also serve a copy of such third-party complaint upon the plaintiff's attorney.
as This tactic produced mixed results. Defendants were permitted to implead co-tortfeasors in Schenck v. Bradshaw, 233 App. Div. 171, 251 N.YS. 316 (3d Dep't 1931); Davis
v. Hauk & Schmidt, Inc., 232 App. Div. 556, 250 N.Y.S. 537 (Ist Dep't 1931); Haines v.
Bero Eng'r Constr. Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N.Y.S. 657 (4th Dep't 1930). Illustrative
of the rationale utilized by the courts to allow impleader is the following:
We are to say what weight is to be given to this consideration where application
is made under section 193, subsection 2 of the [CPA]. Since that section was left
untouched when section 211-a of the [CPA] was enacted, there is no further express encroachment on the established right of a plaintiff with reference to the
joinder of defendants . . . The statute [section 211-a] grants a substantial
right. It was not intended, we think, that the opportunity of a defendant to
utilize that right should depend solely upon the will of a plaintiff; nor should
the courts thwart the legislative purpose by a narrow interpretation of a practice
rule nor by the use of a discretion too restricted in scope.
Haines v. Bero Eng'r Constr. Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 334-35, 243 N.Y.S. 657, 661
(4th Dep't 1930).
Other courts, however, refused to allow impleader: Troshow v. B. Altman & Co., 140
Misc. 420, 250 N.YS. 599 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931); Rowe v. Denler, 135 Misc. 286, 238
N.Y.S. 9 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1929); Rothman v. Byron, 141 Misc. 770, 253 N.Y.S. 812
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approach, however, was dosed by the Court of Appeals in Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Inc. 9 The plaintiff therein, a passenger in
a truck, was injured in a collision with an omnibus owned by the defendant corporation. When the plaintiff did not join the driver of the
truck, the defendant sought to implead him under section 193(2) so as
to secure contribution. The Court held that the impleader provision
could not be applied concurrently with section 211-a to permit a defendant to implead a co-tortfeasor in order to secure the joint judgment
necessary to obtain contribution.4 0 The Court ignored the mandate
of the CPA to the contrary 41 and strictly construed the right to contribution granted by section 211-a. Subsequent application of section 211-a
by the lower courts was consistent with the strict construction rationale
42
of Fox.
Clearly more equitable to a defendant than the common-law rule,
section 211-a, nevertheless, was subject to extensive criticism as not
being completely equitable, in that the right of contribution was entirely contingent upon the plaintiff's election to join joint tortfeasors.
(Westchester County Ct. 1931). Illustrative of the rationale utilized by the courts to deny
impleader is the following:
Under the common law a person injured by the joint negligence of two or more
wrongdoers had the unqualified right to decide for himself whether he would sue
one or all of the said wrongdoers.... Unquestionably the Legislature has modified this common law doctrine. But the Legislature has expressly and dearly
stated the extent of this modification and the circumstances under which it is to
Did the Legislature intend to go further? A statute in
become effective ....
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.
Rothman v. Byron, 141 Misc. 770, 772, 253 N.Y.S. 812, 815 (Westchester County Ct. 1931).
89 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
40 Id. at 308, 178 N.E. at 290. The Court said in pertinent part:
Section 211-a has in no way modified or extended section 193, subdivision 2,
of the Civil Practice Act, or the limitations placed upon it by the courts. The
practice under the latter section is the same now as it has been since 1923. Section
11-a sought to remedy one glaring defect in the law. Where a judgment had
been recovered against two joint tort feasors, the payment by one relieved the
other of all liability, either to the plaintiff or to the paying defendant. This was
changed by requiring the joint defendant to pay his share of the judgment. This
is the only change that has been made. A plaintiff may now sue as many defendants as he pleases whom he thinks may be liable in negligence for his damages.
The Legislature has not yet given this same choice to the defendants to bring in
other parties, whom they think should be liable either in place of or jointly with
those whom the plaintiff has selected. If section 193 is to be extended, it must be
by act of the Legislature and not by the fiat of the courts.
Id. at 308-09, 178 N.E. at 290.
Impleader was also unavailable to joint tortfeasors in England for this purpose. See
Howell v. London Omnibus Co., 2 Ex. D. 365 (1877).
41 Section 3 of the CPA stated: "The rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common law is strictly construed does not apply to this act." See generally An-

not., Constitutionality, Construction, and Effect of Statutes Relating to Exceptions to Rule
Denying Contribution or Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors, 141 A.L.R. 1207 (1942).
42 Booth v. Carleton Co., 236 App. Div. 296, 258 N.Y.. 159 (1st Dep't 1932); Tauro
v. Queens-Nassau Transit Lines, Inc., 168 Misc. 879, 6 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct.Kings County
1938); Morbito v. Rupp, 143 Misc. 385, 256 N.Y.S. 605 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1932).
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The result was a disparity of treatment between "two or more persons
whose conduct was indistinguishable from the viewpoint of fault." 43
The major fault of the statute was summarized in these terms:
This statute requiring joint judgment liability as the necessary
common obligation is unfortunate, not only because it fails to conform to customary notions of contribution generally, but also because it makes contribution available only at the whim of the
injured plaintiff.... That contribution, a remedy obviously for
the benefit of defendants and of no interest whatsoever to the injured plaintiff, should be left in this status is absurd. 44
The Law Revision Commission was the principal critic of section
211-a and repeatedly attempted to secure its amendment. 4 5 In 1936, a
study by the Commission found the following problems with practice
under 211-a:
Section 211-a, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, has failed to
remove the inequities resulting from the harsh rule of the common
law. The New York law as it now stands makes the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors dependent not on their relative
merits or demerits, but upon the chance that the injured person
elects to sue in a single action more than one of them, and the further chance that joint judgment is rendered.46
At that time, the Commission urged that the right to coptribution (1)
should remain available whether the conduct alleged in the complaint
was intentional or negligent, and (2) should not depend upon a joint
judgment. The Commission opposed specific statutory prescriptions as
to procedure on the ground that the courts should be free to deal with
unforeseeable situations as they arose.
CPLR 1401,47 the present contribution provision, is essentially the
1936 REP., supra note 33, at 704.
44 Gregory, Tort Contribution Practicein New York, 20 CoRNni. L.Q. 269, 271 (1935).
The writer evaluates section 211-a in light of decisional law, compares it to Wisconsin
43

practice, and concludes that a statute creating tort contribution without the requirement
of joint judgment is a necessity. See also Gregory, Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort
Contribution in the Injured Plaintiff's Action, 47 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1933).
45 See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 21-73 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 REP.]; id. 29-35

(1941); id. 27-58 (1939); id. 65-88 (1988); id. 67-81 (1987); id. 699 (1936).

40 1936 REP. 704. Among the practical problems which arose under the statute were:
(1) the unavailability of the names of all joint tortfeasors at the commencement of actions;
(2) the hesitance of plaintiffs to sue citizens of foreign states; and (3)the fact that a joint
judgment "tend[ed] to discourage a settlement by one of several tortfeasors since he would
thereby lose his right to contribution." Id. 706.
47 CPLR

1401 reads as follows:
Action by one joint tort-feasor against another. Where a money judgment has been
recovered jointly against defendants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, each defendant who has paid more than his pro rata share shall be
entitled to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess paid
over and above his pro rata share; provided, however, that no defendant shall
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same as CPA 211-a. Despite extensive criticism of 211-a, the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure recommended that no change
be made in view of the provision's impact on substantive rights.48 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals, in Baidach v. Togut,49 had recently
affirmed the strict construction rationale laid down in Fox v. Western
New York Motor Lines, Inc.
With availability of contribution from unjoined tortfeasors foredosed by Fox, defendants were compelled to look elsewhere to circumvent the plaintiff's right of election. Under section 193-a, a defendant
could implead a party who was obliged to indemnify him. Since section
211-a did not change the rules of indemnity practitioners looked to
indemnity to secure relief for defendants.5 1
In contrast to contribution, the right to indemnification is created
by contract, either express or implied-in-law. 52 Under the implied-inlaw category, which encompasses the relationship arising from the commission of a joint tort, New York has traditionally denied indemnity
when the parties are in pari delicto.53
Joint tortfeasors have been considered in pari delicto when the
be compelled to pay any other such defendant an amount greater than his own

pro rata share of the entire judgment. Recovery may be had in a separate action,
or a judgment in the original action against a defendant who has appeared may
be entered on motion made on notice in the original action.
48 See FINAL REP. A-167 (Advance Draft 1961); FouTH REP. 61.

49 7 N.Y.2d 128, 131, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70, 164 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1959). The Court noted
that before the contribution provision becomes applicable, "there must be payment by one
judgment debtor of a judgment outstanding against him and others." Thus, a tortfeasor
who paid a judgment after it had been reversed as to a co-defendant had no right to
appeal. CPLR 1402(b) overturned the Baidach rule by allowing a tortfeasor to appeal a
reversal or modification of a joint judgment as to a co-defendant if he subsequently pays
the judgment. See 2A WK&M 1402.05.
50 See Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 308, 178 N.E. 289, 290
(1931); Perlbinder v. D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Co., 12 Misc. 2d 790, 177 N.Y.S.2d 878
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't
1959); Bonadonna v. City of Buffalo, 156 Misc. 225, 281 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1935).
51 In Westchester Light Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175,
15 N.E. 567 (1938), the Court recognized that an independent duty or obligation owed by
a third-party defendant is sufficient basis for an action for indemnity even though the
third party was not joined in the original action.
52 Burke v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 90, 95, 138 N.E.2d 332, 335, 157 N.Y.S.2d 1,
5 (1956); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471
(1952); Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 308, 178 N.E. 289, 290 (1931).
See also RESTATEMENT OF RSTTUrION, Introductory Note §§ 86-102 (1937).

53 See Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d
661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192
N.E.2d 167, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963); Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach SS. Co.,
9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961); Kennedy v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
282 App. Div. 1001, 125 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't) (per curiam), arfd mem., 307 N.Y. 875,
122 N.E2d 753 (1954). Cf. Colon v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 11 N.Y.2d 446, 184
N.E.2d 294, 230 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1962).
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acts of each caused the injury and their fault was equal in degree and
similar in character.54 To avoid being found in pari delicto, defendants
have drawn extremely fine distinctions concerning the relative degree
of fault attributable to each of the participants in a joint tort. These
distinctions have fallen into two broad categories: (1) those based on
the type of duty owed to the plaintiff; and (2) those based on the type
of negligence attributable to each joint tortfeasor. These categories are
not necessarily mutually exclusive, and the courts have frequently used
elements of each interchangeably. In distinguishing the types of duty
owed to the plaintiff, the courts have used such terms as primary or
secondary, actual or vicarious, and personal or technical. 55 In differentiating the types of negligence chargeable to each tortfeasor, the courts
have applied the active-passive dichotomy.5
Unfortunately, the distinction between indemnity and contribu54 See Bernstein v. El-Mar Painting & Decorating Co., 13 N.Y.2d 1053, 195 N.E.2d
456, 245 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1963) (mem.); Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9
N.Y.2d 426, 174 NE.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961); Dolnick v. Edward Donner Lumber
Corp., 275 App. Div. 954, 89 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 660, 91
N.E.2d 322 (1950).
55 These terms have generally been used in municipality liability cases and in actions
predicated on the principle of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Jackson v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d 167, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963); Sobel v. City of New
York, 9 N.Y.2d 187, 173 N.E.2d 771, 213 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1961); Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892); City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72
N.Y. 65 (1878); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. International Ry., 240 App. Div. 432, 270 N.Y.S. 197
(4th Dep't 1934); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capital City Sur. Co., 224 App. Div. 500, 231
N.Y.S. 169 (Ist Dep't 1928); Fedden v. Brooklyn Dist. Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199
N.Y.S. 9 (2d Dep't 1923); Bonadonna v. City of Buffalo, 156 Misc. 225, 281 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1935).
50 The origin of the active-passive terminology is not certain, but the conceptualization began to emerge in City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. 475, 487 (1872):
Where the parties are not equally criminal, the principal delinquent may be held
responsible to a co-delinquent for damage paid by reason of the offence in which
both were concerned in different degrees as perpetrators.
The Court of Appeals refined this language in Village of Port Jervis v. First National
Bank, 96 N.Y. 550, 555 (1884): "The liability of the author of the act which occasions the
injury.., rests upon his original liability to all persons who may have suffered damages
from his affirmative act of negligence." By 1905, this language had evolved to the point
where the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102
App. Div. 354, 856, 92 N.Y.S. 855, 857 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 185 N.Y. 580, 78 N.E.
1110 (1906), described a party who recovered over as having been "entitled to indemnity
from the active wrongdoer."
Subsequently, a long line of decisions has attempted to clarify this conceptualization.
See Ritto v. Goldberg, 27 N.Y.2d 887, 265 N.E.2d 772, 317 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1970) (per curiam);
Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d 661, 271
N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174
N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961); Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d
691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959); Burke v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 90, 138 N.E.2d 332, 157
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N.Y. 395, 131 N.E.2d 564 (1955); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952); Schwartz v. Merola Bros.
Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943); Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator
Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936); Scott v. Curtis, 195 N.Y. 424, 88 N.E. 794 (1909).
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tion has been confused in attempts to categorize fault between tortfeasors according to the active-passive dichotomy. 7 Finding that litigation entangled in distinctions between "active" and "passive" fault
had greatly increased from 1941 to 1952, the Law Revision Commission
proposed a more flexible contribution rule as a substitute for the prevailing practice.58 It recognized the conceptual distinction between
contribution and indemnity, but noted the difficulty of formulating a
clear test to clarify that distinction in practice., 9 While the "activepassive" or "primary-secondary" dichotomy has been the basis of New
York law as to when indemnity is appropriate, it has been difficult
to set down any definitive rule as to the availability of such relief.60
Early attempts to distinguish acts of omission from those of commission soon splintered into numerous classifications. While acts of
omission with acquiescence were deemed active negligence, 61 finding
constructive knowledge alone was held to be an insufficient basis for
finding acquiescence.6 2 The problem was further complicated by dis57 See 1952 REP., supra note 45, at 37-55; Note, Indemnity Among Joint Tort-feasors
in New York: Active and Passive Negligence and Impleader, 28 FORDaAm L. Rxv. 782
(1960) [hereinafter Indemnity in New York].
58 1952 R r. 28. The Commission stated in part:
In the absence of any rule for pro-rating the burden, or apportioning it equally
among those responsible, the trend is toward development through precedent of
rules of law defining failure in the duty of care owed in a variety of typical
situations as "active" or "passive" negligence and thus fixing a rule of indemnity
in many cases where a rule of contribution would be a fairer and more reasonable
one.
Id. 37.
59 The Commission in an attempt to define those situations where indemnity has been
allowed approached the problem through factual similarities and arrived at the following
categories: (1) sidewalk cases; (2) building construction cases; (3) injury in or about buildings cases; (4) auto collision cases; (5) miscellaneous cases.
A distinction between the terminology "active-passive" and "primary-secondary" can
be implied from the Commission report, in that "active" is used in terms of causation,
while "primary" is used in terms of responsibility.
0oSee 2 WK&M
1007.02. For a history of New York indemnity cases, see 1952 REP.
37-55; Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the
New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. RLv. 84 (1950). See generally Davis. "in
deciding what negligence is 'active' and what is 'passive,' a trial judge will receive almost
as much assistance from tossing a coin as he will from pondering the opinions of the
appellate tribunals." Thornton & McNiece, Torts &, Workmen's Compensation, 32 N.Y.U.L.

Rnv. 1465, 1471 (1957).
61 See Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y.S. 855 (2d Dep't 1905),
af'd mem., 185 N.Y. 580, 78 N.E. 1110 (1906).
62 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Costanzi, 140 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955). Prior cases illustrate the various subtleties which were being read
into the "active-passive" dichotomy. The Court, in Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp.,
290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943), drew a distinction between actual and constructive
knowledge and held the former to be active negligence which defeated indemnity. In
Tipaldi v. Riverside Mem. Chapel, 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't), aff'd
mem., 298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E.2d 585 (1948), the court observed that the right to indemnity
should be the same whether the fault of the primary wrongdoer was attributable to a
negligent act of commission or omission. Dolnick v. Edward Donner Lumber Corp., 275
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tinctions between delegable and non-delegable duties concerning original liability and by determinations concerning the rights and obligations of the negligent parties among themselves in terms of final
liability.63 Though the rules were not incomprehensible, complexity
was increased by the number of parties involved, as where a property
owner, a general contractor, and several subcontractors were brought
into the action.64
An excellent evaluation of the "active-passive" or "primary-second65
ary" dichotomy was set out in McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge.
A longshoreman had been injured by carbon tetrachloride fumes which
had escaped due to alleged defects in containers supplied by Dow Chemical Company. Dow in turn accused the plaintiff's employer, Transoceanic, of negligence in handling the drums and in failing to properly
supervise the loading. The owner of the ship, Belgian Line, was chargeable with the non-delegable duty of providing a safe place to work.
Although Dow was denied indemnity, Dow's negligence in containing
the substance being deemed active, a right of indemnity was recognized
in favor of Belgian Line, whose "mere failure to perform a non-delegable duty imposed by law" was held to be passive negligence. 6 The
Court of Appeals, relying on Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel,6 7
concluded that tortfeasors guilty of negligence in law as to the person
injured were not necessarily in pari delicto as to each other.
Most significant in the decision, however, was the statement by the
Court that whether or not the act involved was one of omission,
the factual disparity between the delinquency of Transoceanic and
Dow and that of Belgian Line [was] so great here that the jury was
justified in concluding that Belgian Line's fault of omission was
only passive negligence.6 8
The new concept of "factual disparity" which emerged from McFall
was a clear indication of judicial dissatisfaction with the absence of any
App. Div. 954, 89 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 660, 91 N.E.2d 322
(1950), continued the digression by holding that constructive knowledge could be equated
with active negligence if a party failed in his duty to acquire actual knowledge. For further
elaboration on this dissection of the active-passive rule, see Indemnity in New York, supra
note 57, at 786-87; Note, Indemnity among Tortfeasors in New York, 39 CoaELL. L.Q. 484,
498-99 (1954).
63 See Tipaldi v. Riverside Mem. Chapel, 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Ist Dep't),
af'd mem., 298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E2d 585 (1948); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Costanzi, 140 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. CL Westchester County 1955).
64 See Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943).
05 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E2d 463 (1952).
C6 Id. at 329, 107 N.EY2d at 478.
67 273 App. Div. 414 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E.2d 585 (1948).
68 304 N.Y. at 330, 107 N.E.2d at 471. "Whether negligence is passive or active is generally speaking, a question of fact for the jury." Id. at 328, 107 N.E.2d at 471.
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satisfactory rule defining active and passive conduct and with the sterile
nomenclature used to categorize such behavior. Several observers have
viewed McFall as an attempt to resolve the confusion in terminology
by demonstrating that the terms "active" and "passive" were not rules
in themselves but findings of fact to guide the jury's evaluation of the
relative culpability of the wrongdoers. 69
Subsequent decisions made little use of the "factual disparity" concept as an analytical device but followed its implications by engaging
in a more meaningful analysis of the respective culpabilities of the
wrongdoers. For example, in Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co.,70 certain
contractors who had done work in the plant of the decedents' employer
were sued for personal injuries and wrongful death. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming the denial of an attempted impleader by the
contractors of the plant owner, offered several distinctive propositions
in support of its decision. First, it asserted that since the complaint
could be interpreted as including allegations of both active and passive
negligence, the defendants would have a right of impleader against a
third party charged with active negligence. 71 Second, the Court stated:
It is the omission or failure to perform a nondelegable type of
duty (e.g., the duty of an owner... to furnish the injured party
with a safe place to work), as distinguished from the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which constitutes passive negligence entitling one to indemnity... .Y2
The Putvin decision, which emphasized the respective duties of
the wrongdoers and liberalized the availability of impleader under the
pleadings, was an earnest attempt to clarify the right of indemnity
within the existing rules of third-party practice.
69 Indemnity in New York at 787-88 (1960). After an analysis of McFall, the following

generalizations were made:
The decisions turn on a disparity in culpability between the parties ....
This
disparity would seem to be a mixed question of law and fact. The jury must
ultimately determine whether the difference in culpability is such as to merit recovery, but it is the responsibility of the judge to determine whether the nature
of the parties' actions justifies turning the matter over to the jury.
See also Note, Indemnity among Tortfeasors in New York, 39 Co.NFLL L.Q. 484, 499 (1954).
705 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
t1Id. at 455, 158 N.E2d at 695, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The Court cited Johnson v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 278 App. Div. 626, 101 N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dep't 1951). Subsequent cases
have followed this rule: Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d
167, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963); Finley v. New York Cent. R.R., 50 Misc. 2d 194, 270 N.Y.S.2d
349 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 897, 269 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dep't
1966); De Lilli v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 839, 202 N.Y.S.2d 857

(3d Dep't 1960).
725

N.Y.2d at 456, 158 N.E.2d at 696, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
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Contrastingly, in Bush Terminal Buildings Co. v. Luckenbach
Steamship Co.,7 3 the defendant, an operator of a pier, was denied any
right to indemnity. The decision was consistent with the postulates of
Putvin and McFall since the defendant was solely charged with creating and maintaining a dangerous situation. This allegation clearly distinguishes the failure to observe the requisite degree of care for the
protection of others from the failure to furnish a safe place to work as
was alleged in Putvin.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Bush Terminal case was
the fact that the Court of Appeals therein reversed the lower court
decision.7" The lower court opinion was an exhaustive appraisal of the
development of the New York law as to indemnity, and it had expressed
deep dissatisfaction with the prevailing practice.7 5
Musco v. Conte76 can also be read as representing further discontent with indemnity rules. An action had been brought for the
wrongful death of a person whose hand had been crushed while he was
helping to extricate the defendant's automobile. A third-party claim
was asserted by the defendant against the hospital and an attendant
who were alleged to have caused the death by negligently administering
an anesthetic. The appellate division reversed the lower court dismissal
of the third-party complaint and held that the defendant and the hospital were not joint tortfeasors, but successive and independent tortfeasors. Additionally, since the culpability of the defendant was of a
lesser degree, the rule that impleader of a third party would not lie at
73 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.YS.2d 428 (1961).
74 11 App. Div. 2d 220, 202 N.Y.S2d 172 (Ist Dep't 1960).
75 After reviewing the applicable principles as to the right to indemnity between joint
tortfeasors, the court detailed its dissatisfaction with their application.
Many difficulties ...arise, and for two reasons. First, when the question arises
on the pleadings and before trial, there are difficulties in interpreting the allegations of the complaint. The pleader (prime plaintiff) is hardly concerned with the
problem among the defendants, inter se, and no effort is made to categorize the
allegations to assist in the solution of the problem of liability among them.
The second reason for difficulty, and the more basic one, stems from the uncertain applicability of the substantive law. Even when the evidentiary facts have
been ascertained, there is often uncertainty as to whether indemnification is appropriate, especially where the right depends partly upon the weighing of the "comparative culpabiities" among different kinds of wrongdoing.
Id. at 225, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 179. The court expressed further disenchantment with the use
of the active-passive dichotomy as the solution to these problems.
The most serious difficulty with the "active-passive" terminology is that it
can be manipulated to produce any result. One need only enlarge the definition
of the act of the actor to make it "active," while by reducing the definition one
can make the act passive."
Id. at 227, 202 N.YS.2d at 181. The court favored the use of primary-secondary terminology
which it felt would lead to a legal analysis of the facts as opposed to a conclusory pronouncement through use of the terms "active" and "passive." Id. at 225-27, 202 N.Y.S.2d
at 179-81.
76 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964),
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the instance of a tortfeasor in pari delicto was inapplicable. 77 The language, "lesser degree," used in Musco was a marked departure from the
"active-passive" standard and its subsequent refinements.
It was against this background that the Court of Appeals in Dole
adopted a comparative fault approach in third-party practice.
Dole: Equitable Apportionment Among Joint Tortfeasors
On June 7, 1969, George Urban Milling Company fumigated a
grain storage bin with methyl bromide, a deadly fumigant manufactured by Dow Chemical Company. The product had been labeled as
poisonous and highly volatile. Shortly after the fumigation, Urban directed its employee, Ralph Dole, to clean the bin. Dole was exposed to
the chemical and died as a result on June 11. Dole's administratrixwife instituted a negligence action, against Dow alone for wrongful
death and pain and suffering, alleging that Dow had failed to properly
label its highly dangerous product and had failed to adequately warn
and instruct as to its use. Urban was immune from suit7 8 by its employee's estate under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
In answer to the main complaint, Dow denied negligence on its
part and alleged that the decedent had negligently caused his own
death. In addition, Dow commenced a third-party action against Urban
for indemnity against any recovery by the plaintiff. Dow alleged that
Urban's negligence was active and primary in that it had "had actual
knowledge of the danger in the use of Methyl Bromide and had sole
control over its employees exposed to the Methyl Bromide, '79 yet had
created a dangerous and ultimately fatal condition. Dow deemed its
negligence, if any, in labeling or warning, to have been passive and
secondary, entitling it to implead Urban and recover over. Dow maintained that it had supplied Urban with sufficient instructions and literature regarding the fumigant's use.
On November 11, 1969, the Supreme Court, Erie County, denied
Urban's motion to dismiss Dow's third-party complaint. Urban ap77 Id. at 126, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
78 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § II (McKinney 1965). The exclusivity provision has
been held not to bar recovery over from an employer by a third person sued by an employee. See Westchester Light Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175,
15 N.E. 567 (1938).

The [third person] does not sue for damages "on account of" [the employee's]
death. [He] asserts [his] own right of recovery for breach of an alleged independent duty or obligation owed to [him] by the [employer].
Id. at 179, 15 N.E. at 568.
79 Brief for Appellant at 9, Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1972). A third-party complaint against McLeod Industrial Fumigators & City Exterminators, Inc., the product's distributor, was dismissed, and the plaintiff subsequently joined McLeod as a co-defendant. Id. at S.
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pealed, and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously
reversed and granted the motion. 0 The court reasoned that: (1) if Dow
were successful in proving the allegations in its third-party complaint
or those in its answer to the main complaint, the main complaint would
be dismissed, and Dow would not require indemnity; and (2) if Dow
were unsuccessful, its active negligence in improperly marketing a
dangerous product would be established, and it would not be entitled
to indemnity."'
Dow then appealed to have the third-party complaint reinstated,
arguing that it had been charged with passive negligence in the main
complaint and that the active-passive determination should await the
trial. Most significantly, citing the difficulty of defining and applying
the active-passive dichotomy and lamenting the "fundamental injustice" of suing a remote manufacturer alone when the employer who
allegedly precipitated the injury was immune from suit by the plaintiffemployee's estate, Dow argued for a limited exception to the indemnity
rules. Dow urged the Court of Appeals to
judicially promulgate a liberal standard of impleader permitting a
third-party complaint to be maintained against an actively negligent employer where the plaintiff, injured in the course of his
employment, commences a negligence action against a remote
defendant charging the remote defendant 8with
only the failure or
2
omission to act for the benefit of plaintiff

In response, on March 22, 1972, the Court of Appeals, per Judge
Bergan, eliminated the active-passive test and permitted Dow to im83
plead Urban.
Initially, the Court decried such " 'artificial distinctions' "as activepassive negligence and misfeasance-nonfeasance, 4 which had "proven
elusive and difficult of fair application,"8 5 and categorized types of
80 85 App. Div. 2d 149, 316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (4th Dep't 1970).
Sl Id. at 151, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
82 Brief for Appellant at 22, Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). The facts of Dole were not so dissimilar from those of prior
cases as to require different treatment.
83 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), rev'g 35 App. Div. 2d 149,
316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (4th Dep't 1970). The Court did not question the active quality of Dow's
negligence. Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y..2d at 385, citing Jackson v. Associated
Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 116, 192 N.E.2d 167, 169, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210, 213 (1968);
Colon v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 446, 451, 184 N.E.2d 294, 297, 230
N.YS.2d 697, 702 (1962); Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426,
430, 174 N.E.2d 516, 517 et seq., 214 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1961); Putvin v. Buffalo'Elec. Co.,
5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.YS.2d 15 (1959); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime
Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 329-30, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471-72 (1952).
84 80 N.Y.2d at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389, quoting A Workable Rule
of Contribution at 126.
85 Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
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negligence as primary and secondary, preferring these terms as more
technically accurate.8 6 Turning to the paramount policy question of
how responsibility should ultimately be distributed, the Court stated:
There are situations when the facts would in fairness warrant what
Dow here seeks- passing on to Urban all responsibility that may
be imposed on Dow for negligence, a traditional full indemnification. There are circumstances where the facts would not, by the
same test of fairness, warrant passing on to a third party any of the
liability imposed. There are circumstances which would justify apportionment of responsibility between third-party plaintiff and
third-party defendant, in effect a partial indemnification.8 7
After observing that at common law any apportionment among
tortfeasors was barred by "the unwillingness of the law as a matter of
policy to make relative value judgments of degrees of culpability
among wrongdoers,"'8s the Court concluded that the doctrine is no
longer strictly applied, citing CPLR 1401 and the active-passive dichotomy itself. Stating that the test had become a kind of measure of degrees
of responsibility, it averred that "the result has been that there has in
fact emerged from the statutory change and from the judicial decisions
an actual apportionment among those who participate responsibly in
89
actionable torts."

Because of these changes and because of the widespread dissatisfaction with the imprecision and inequities of the active-passive limitation, the Court reached
[t]he conclusion ... that where a third party is found to have been

responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a
defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach
that end there must necessarily be an apportionment of responsibility in negligence between those parties. 90
The right to an apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors
or to full indemnity was to be predicated on relative responsibility and
86 Id. The Court did not further explain its preference.
87 Id. The Court adopted the following statement:
As long as our present tort system is retained, an effective contribution and indemnity scheme is necessary to handle the growing problems created by multiple
tort liability ....
The present system runs counter to tort policy goals of deterrence, equitable loss sharing by all the wrongdoers, effective loss distribution over
a large segment of society, and rapid compensation of the plaintiff-as well as
the judicial economy interest in settling all matters arising out of the same
transaction in one proceeding.
Id. at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389, quoting Contribution and Indemnity in
California at 516.

88 Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.YS.2d at 886.
89 Id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
POId, at 14-49, 282 N.E2d at 292, 331 N.Y..2d at 387.
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was to be determined by the jury on the facts. 91 The Court emphasized
that "'[t]he deciding factor, then, should be fairness as between the
parties.' "92
Procedurally, the Court allowed trial courts to determine whether
to try together or separately the separate claims of the plaintiff against
the defendant and the defendant-third-party plaintiff against the thirdparty defendant. Either or both claims could be decided by the court
at the stipulation of the parties. If tried together by a jury, the jury
would be instructed to consider the claim over only if the third-party
plaintiff were found negligent. A Dole apportionment also would be
available in a separate action. 93 The right to contribution under CPLR
1401 was deemed inapplicable where there has been a Dole apportionment:
In authorizing equally shared contribution among tortfeasors
jointly found liable, this statute did not contemplate an apportionment already made in the judgment, and the "joint" responsibility described was not one of indemnity.9 4
Chief Judge Fuld and Judges Breitel, Jasen, and Gibson concurred
in Judge Bergen's opinion. Judges Burke and Scileppi dissented and
voted to affirm.
The Impact of Dole
The revolutionary nature of the Dole decision is much greater
than the Court indicated. The Court suggested that an actual system
of apportionment had developed prior to Dole. It cited CPLR 1401,
which allows contribution on a pro rata basis, and the broad determination made as to active or passive negligence, which entails a total
shifting, and not an apportionment of liability. Clearly, the Court was
too modest in describing its decision as part of a previous system of
apportionment.
Dole establishes a kind of comparative negligence among defendants9 5 by (1) eliminating the requirement of a joint judgment
under CPLR 1401, and (2) allowing an equitable apportionment of
331 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92.
at 151, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390, quoting Leflar at 159.
93 Id. at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.YS.2d at 387, citing Westchester Light Co. v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E. 567 (1938).
94 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
95 See Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 450, 333 N.Y.S2d 699, 701 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1972) (mem.): "The Dole case... enunciates a new doctrine respecting the
presence of co-tortfeasors in negligence actions, to wit: comparative-negligence as between
defendants. .. "
91 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295,
92 Id.
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damages among joint tortfeasors. This dramatic development is a welcome landmark in New York jurisprudence.
Since the Dole Court expressed a preference for the primarysecondary terminology and omitted those terms from its list of artificial distinctions, one may wonder whether the old active-passive
test has yielded to a new primary-secondary test. It is clear that
Dole allows an active tortfeasor to implead another active tortfeasor.
But, under Dole, can an active tortfeasor implead a passive tortfeasor?
Or, can a primary tortfeasor implead a secondary tortfeasor? The
looseness of the Court's language in this regard raises these questions, and it is possible that a future Court may seize on such language
to retreat from the broad and largely uncharted course set by Dole.
The Court imagined different situations where full indemnification,
partial indemnification, or no indemnification was appropriate, but
did not specify or illustrate. The ultimate question, then, is how broad
was the broad and frequently ambiguous Dole language intended to
be? What is the scope of Dole?
All indications are that the impact of Dole will be vast.9 6 One
eminent authority has concluded that "[t]he potential of the Dole
doctrine is astounding."97 Initially, Dole represents new law on indemnification. It eliminates the active-passive test for indemnification, permitting partial indemnification among joint tortfeasors based on an
apportionment of responsibility. While Dole concerned third-party
practice, it logically applies in the cross-claim context when a defendant
seeks indemnity from a co-defendant. The Court of Appeals, in Kelly
v. Long Island Lighting Co.,98 has permitted a cross-claim for apportionment of liability among defendants.
Kelly, a co-plaintiff, was employed by a subcontractor on a construction site owned by defendant Herrick Manor, Inc., the general
96 "It will probably be years before the full impact of Dole can be measured." McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 48, Sept. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 1. For a comprehensive discussion of the ramifications of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 205-38 (1972).
97 McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 167 N.Y.L.J. 93, May 12, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
98 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 834 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972) (5-2). A Dole cross-claim
has also been allowed in Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 764, 284 N.E2d 579, 333
N.Y.S.2d 425 (1972) (mem.); Wood v. City of New York, 39 App. Div. 2d 534, 330 N.Y.S2d
923 (1st Dep't 1972) (mem.); Nucelli v. Dickens, 70 Misc. 2d 143, 832 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1972) (mem.); Kelly v. Diesel Constr., 70 Misc. 2d 686, 334 N.YS2d 309
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
Dole impleader has been allowed in Vaughan v. B&B Supermarket, Inc., 89 App.
Div. 2d 825, 333 N.Y.S.2d 53 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.); Murray v. Rupp Rental Corp., 39
App. Div. 2d 637, 332 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.); Langner v. Eschwege, 89
App. Div. 2d 653, 332 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Ist Dep't 1972) (mem.); Keefe v. Balling Constr.,
Inc., 39 App. Div. 2d 638, 31 N.YS.2d 293 (4th Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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contractor. Kelly and his wife sought to recover for the injuries he
suffered when, in the course of his employment, he touched a steel
bucket attached to a cable from the boom of a crane in operation at
the site, the boom being in contact with high tension wires owned and
maintained by defendant Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO).
LILCO knew of the construction, but took no precautionary measures.
Herrick's president knew of the danger, but gave no warning prior to
the accident. Herrick and LILCO cross-claimed against each other for
judgment over if either were held liable to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, dismissed both cross-claims
on the ground that Herrick and LILCO had been guilty of active negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs against both
defendants. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. 9
On Herrick's appeal, the Court of Appeals, per Judge Jasen, modified the appellate division's order and allowed Herrick's cross-claim,100
reiterating Dole's breadth and its simple reliance on the fairness of an
apportionment rule:
The rule as stated in Dole now permits apportionment of damages
among joint or concurrent tort-feasors regardless of the degree or
nature of the concurring fault. We believe the new rule of apportionment to be pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair. To
require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally
negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe,
is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring
fault. 01
The Court, having held in Dole that such an apportionment is
available under CPLR 1007, "perceive[d] no reason why CPLR 3019(b)
10 2
may not likewise be employed."
In Sorrentinov. United States,10 3 the United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York, was presented with a Dole claim in the
context of a counterclaim, where one of the plaintiffs was involved in
more than one capacity. The infant plaintiff was struck and injured by
a government vehicle. The child sued for his personal injuries by his
99 36 App. Div. 2d 822, 321 N.Y.S.2d 337 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
100 31 N.Y.2d at 29, 286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854. Judges Burke and Scileppi

dissented. They voted to reverse and dismiss the complaint as against Herrick on the
ground that its negligence had not been established.
1O1 Id. Since the jury found both defendants negligent and the defendants had
stipulated that the trial judge decide the cross-claims, the Court remitted the case to the
Supreme Court, Kings County, for the court to fix the percentages of liability. Id. at 29-30,
286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
102 Id. at 29 n.3, 286 N.E2d at 243 n.3, 334 N.YS.2d at 854 n.3.
203 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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father as guardian ad litem, and his father sued for medical expenses
and loss of the infant's services. The government moved for leave to
amend its answer to include allegations of the parents' negligent supervision, a counterclaim against the plaintiff-father, and a third-party
complaint against the parents. In the proposed counterclaim, the government asked for recovery over against any judgment against it. Citing
Dole and Kelly, the court granted the government's motion, stating that
the Government under Dole, if it can show that parental negligence
was partly causative of the infant's injury and damage, can recover
from the parents so much of the entire damage for which it may be
held liable as is apportionable to the contribution of negligence
of the parents
compared with the Government's contribution of
04
negligence.
While Dole was a negligence case, it logically should also apply
in the strict liability and breach of warranty areas, where liability is
imposed without fault. In Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,105 an action for
negligence and breaches of implied and express warranties, the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, applied Dole to the implied warranty area. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff-car owner, injured in an accident caused by a defective carburetor, against Ford
Motor Company, the manufacturer, on all three causes of action, and
against McGoldrick Mercury Motors, the dealer, on negligence and
breach of implied warranty. McGoldrick cross-claimed against Ford on
the negligence and implied warranty causes. Although finding McGoldrick guilty of active negligence, the court allowed both cross-claims,
stating:
Even though the Dole case was concerned only with a negligence
action, the principle developed in that case should also be and is
applied to these implied warranty causes of action because they
arose only because of defendants' negligence. 10 6
104 Id. at 1309. A Dole counterclaim has also been allowed in Meade v. Roberts,
71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972); Yarish v. Dowling, 70
Misc. 2d 467, 333 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972) (mem.) (third-party

complaint deemed supplemental answer; counterclaim against plaintiff-driver to apply to
co-plaintiff-passenger's cause of action); DeLucia v. Bundock, 168 N.Y.L.J. 12, July 19,
1972, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County); and Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599,
334 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (defendants granted leave to amend answer
to assert counterclaim against co-plaintiff-driver). In Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d
449, 333 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972) (mem.), the defendants were allowed
to "cross-complain" against a co-plaintiff-administrator-driver.
105 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
106 Id. at -, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
By extending the Dole doctrine into the warranty field, Justice Pittoni . . .
arrived at a result which is every bit as sweeping as Dole. Heretofore, warranty,
while wandering in the mists which separate contract from tort law, has been
uniformly regarded as a form of liability without fault. Under the Ford Motor
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Whether Dole will encompass the area of intentional torts is a closer
question. The right to a Dole apportionment was specifically conferred
on "parties involved together in causing damage by negligence....",107
At common law, the rule against contribution was devised to discourage intentional torts by allowing the plaintiff to require one joint tortfeasor to satisfy all damages flowing from a joint tort. Later, this rule
was extended by American courts to include negligence. It is clear that
Dole has totally removed this restriction in negligence cases. It may be
argued, however, on deterrence grounds, that Dole should not be applied to intentional torts. But it is doubtful that the unavailability of
apportionment would be an effective deterrent to the potential tortfeasor, especially in view of the questionable validity of even the death
penalty as a deterrent. 0 8 Since the intentional joint tortfeasor now has
the right to obtain contribution under CPLR 1401, it is conceivable
that he will be granted the right to a Dole apportionment. It seems
likely, however, that the Court of Appeals will deny this right to intentional tortfeasors on other public policy grounds.
Furthermore, Dole has called into question the continued vitality
of CPLR 1401, which allows a joint tortfeasor to obtain contribution
when he has paid more than his pro rata share of a joint judgment.
After Dole and Kelly, a defendant can implead a joint tortfeasor and
obtain a Dole apportionment, or he can cross-claim against a co-defendant for such an apportionment. He can also seek apportionment in an
independent action. And an unequal Dole apportionment cannot be upset by subsequent use of CPLR 1401. Thus, it appears that the contribution statute is largely superseded by Dole. Legislative reconsideration
of CPLR 1401 is clearly in order. If Dole is held inapplicable to intentional torts, CPLR 1401 will remain applicable in that area. Nevertheless, CPLR 1401 should be harmonized with Dole. It should be redrafted to provide for contribution when a joint tortfeasor has paid
more than his apportioned share of damages (i.e., where there was a
right to apportionment and no requirement of a joint judgment) or
more than his pro rata share of a joint judgment (i.e., where there was
a right to contribution but no right to apportionment). The joint judgment requirement for contribution when there is no right to apportionCo. decision, however, it now appears that if the court can find some way to
apportion damages, i.e., some disparity in the fault of the co-defendants, it will
do so.
McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.LJ. 48, Sept. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
107 Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 391 (1972).
108 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); IL
M-NNMNGER, THE CRiME OF PuNsuAENT (1968).
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ment could be eliminated if the Legislature determines that further
liberalization would be salutary.
The fact that Dole indemnity can be pursued in a separate action
raises the problem of waiver. Under what circumstances, if any, will a
court hold that the right to a Dole apportionment has been intentionally relinquished? The Dole Court itself imposed no restrictions
on the option of an independent action. Nevertheless, there may be
circumstances in which a waiver will be found when a defendant does
not implead a co-tortfeasor. The strongest case for waiver will occur
when a defendant chooses not to cross-claim against a co-defendant.
At this point in Dole's development, it would be premature to adopt a
strict waiver policy.
The practitioner should, of course, avoid potential waiver problems by resolving all issues arising from a breach of duty in one action.
Since third-party practice is consistent with the CPLR's mandate for
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of disputes0 9 and in the
interest of economical judicial administration, it should be encouraged.
A single fact-trier should determine the main claim and the proportionate responsibility of all participants. It can be anticipated that
courts will dismiss or sever third-party actions only where the rights of
a party would be clearly prejudiced otherwise.'" An independent action should only be commenced where jurisdiction could not have been
obtained over the defendant at the time of the original action.
In Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co.,"'. the Court of Appeals applied Dole, stating: "We, of course, give effect to the law as it exists at
the time of our decision." 112 Additionally, it appears that Dole will be
retroactive." 3 Dole represents a new substantive right; it does not
prejudice any right, and therefore, should be given full retroactive
effect. For cases pending when Dole was decided, amendment of the
pleadings and perhaps supplementary disclosure proceedings will be
109 CPLR 104. "To avoid a multiplicity of suits, the best procedure would be to bring
all persons before the Court in the one action." Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334
N.Y.S.2d 662 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
110 See Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 450, 333 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1972) (mem.): "[W]here either indemnity or contribution is desired, [Dole]
permits the widest latitude in joining defendants .. "
11131 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
112 Id. at 29 n.3, 286 N.E.2d at 243 n.3, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854 n.3, citing, e.g., People
v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
113 See Meade v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 122, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349, 852 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1972) ("The Dole decision was intended to be remedial in nature and is applicable
retrospectively.'); Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 451, 333 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1972) (mem.) (retroactive application). For favorable discussion of retroactive application, see Keeton, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 906, 911-12
(1968).
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in order. For cases already decided, an independent action for Dole
indemnity should be allowed, provided it is commenced within six
years after satisfaction of the original judgment.11 4
Dole: A Harbingerof Comparative Negligence in New York
Dole establishes a rule of comparative negligence among defendants, relying on the inherent fairness of an apportionment rule. It has
been opined that Dole "set[s] New York on a course which will lead
inexorably to the judicial adoption of the doctrine of comparative
negligence.""' 5 Presently, a plaintiff must prove his freedom from contributory negligence in order to recover. This anomaly is most striking
in the context of an independent suit for Dole indemnity where a defendant becomes a plaintiff and recovers despite fault through an apportionment of liability:
[I]f the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, but his contributory
negligence was only 5 per cent responsible for the damage caused
by the defendant, should not the plaintiff, by parity of reasoning
from Dole, now be entitled to recover 95 per cent of his damages
from the more culpable defendant?1
The contributory negligence rule, which has been termed "a defendant's substantive right,"' 1 7 mandates a total denial of relief to a
plaintiff who has contributed to his own injury, even in the slightest
degree.:" The concept of negligence as a distinct area of legal liability
did not begin "to take shape" until the late eighteenth century. 119
Previously, liability was based on causation, i.e., the one who caused the
114 The statute of limitations for contract actions is six years from the date that the

cause of action accrued. CPLR 213.
The general rule is . .. that the action [for indemnity] accrues not at the time
of the commission of the tort for which indemnity is sought, but at the time of
the payment of the judgment . . . ; and its rule applies as well to third-party
complaints....
lusco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 125-26, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 595 (2d Dep't 1964).
115 McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 167 N.Y.L.J. 93, May 12, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
But see McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 8, July 13, 1972, at 4, col. 1:
"It now appears that Dole will have absolutely no impact on plaintiffs, and that the apportionment of damages between the co-defendants is a matter of concern solely to those
defendants."
116 McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 167 N.Y.L.J. 93, May 12, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
117 Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a
Special Defense Against Action by the Injured Party, 52 Comam-L L.Q. 407, 412 (1967). See

Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 134, 169 N.E. 112, 115 (1929) (a leading
New York comparative negligence case; verdict based on Ontario comparative negligence
statute upheld where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered in Canada while employed by the
defendant, a New York corporation).
118 See Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 134, 169 N.E. 112, 115 (1929);
Grippens v. New York Cent. R.R., 40 N.Y. 34 (1869).
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injury, regardless of culpability, was liable in damages. 120 In formulating their policy on recovery for negligence, the courts rejected a proportional or comparative approach in favor of an "all or nothing form."' 21
The rationale for this stringent rule was judicial unwillingness to aid
22
wrongdoers, even where their conduct was mere "neglectfulness."'
Although a system of dividing damages has existed in cases of mutual fault in the English admiralty court since the seventeenth century,123 this concept was not applied in the English courts of law, where
24 established the rule of contributory negliButterfield v. Forrester1
gence as a complete bar to recovery. The plaintiff therein, while "riding
violently" down a highway, was knocked down by a pole negligently
left by the defendant. From these words of Chief Justice Ellenborough,
the rule has been extracted: 1 25 "A party is not to cast himself upon an
120 See id. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1617), is an early case stating the

causation rule. Originally, the contributory negligence rule was invariably explained in
terms of proximate causation, i.e., the plaintiff was barred from recovery because his
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. This rationale lost its vigor when
the courts began to recognize that an injury could result from more than one proximate
cause. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REv. 1, 2
(1946). For discussion of the relation between contributory negligence and proximate
causation and criticism of some courts' failure to distinguish the concepts, see 2 HARPER &
JAMEs 1199-1201; PROsSER, SELEcTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (1954) [hereinafter
SELcmgr
Topics]; Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Causation, 6 N.C.L.
REv. 3, 11 et seq. (1927).
1212 HARPR & JAMEs 1207.
122 See Leflar at 132. One basis for criticism of this viewpoint is its inconsistency.

Courts will allow plaintiffs with "unclean hands" to recover under certain circumstances,
e.g., when the "Last Clear Chance" doctrine is applied. See PROSSER 417. For appraisals of
the contributory negligence rule and its justifications, see 2 HARPER & JAMES 1199-1209;
SELECrED Topics, supra note 120, at 5-7; Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36
(1944); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674, 675-85 (1934); Mole & Wilson,
A Study of ComparativeNegligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 604, 643-45 (1932). "No one has ever
succeeded in justifying [the rule], and no one ever will." SE.EcrLM Topics 7.
123 See Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333,
341-46 (1932). The first decision to divide damages in a collision case in England appeared
in 1614, and thereafter the practice of apportionment was expanded to various situations
until it was adopted generally by the House of Lords in Hay v. Le Neve, [1824] A.C. 395
(Scot.), approving the famous dictum of The Woodrup Sims, 2 Dodson Adm. 83, 85 (1815).
In 1854, the United States Supreme Court held that apportionment should be used in
collision cases in the admiralty courts. See The Schooner Catherine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170
(1854). This was further extended to all maritime torts in 1890. See The Max Morris, 137

U.S. 1 (1890).
Originally, the admiralty courts utilized the equal division rule of damages where both
ships were at fault, rather than the pure percentage apportionment approach. The former
method has been criticized as creating, although to a lesser degree, the same injustice as
the contributory negligence rule, in that a party partially at fault incurs more damages
than he deserves. See Mole & Wilson, supra, at 341. England statutorily adopted the pure
apportionment rule in 1911, but the United States still adheres to the equal division rule
in collision cases. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 476 (1953).
In maritime personal injury cases, apportionment is now the rule. See note 136 infra.
124 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
125 There has been much speculation as to why the rule was so readily adopted. See
Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HAtv. L. REv. 233 (1908). See also Maloney, From
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obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail
himself of it, if he do[es] not himself use common and ordinary caution
1 26
to be in the right.'
The contributory negligence rule was universally adopted in
American jurisdictions. 12 7 The doctrine took hold during a time of
industrial development and was consistent with the laissez-faire economic and political philosophy which characterized the period. Accompanying this industrial growth was a concomitant increase in the
number and magnitude of accidents suffered by employees and the
general populationuB The rule, it is said, developed as a check on
sympathetic juries, whose verdicts could have had potentially crippling
effects on infant industries, a result which would have been in direct
contravention to the social policy of encouraging free economic
129
growth.
The harshness of absolute application of the contributory negligence rule gave rise to exceptions. 30 One of these exceptions is the
Contributory to ComparativeNegligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135,
141 (1958) [hereinafter From Contributory to Comparative Negligence], wherein it is
stated: "One wonders whether the case might have been decided differently if the proportion of fault of the plaintiff had not been so great."
126 103 Eng. Rep. at 927. Cf. Flower v. Adam, 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1810); Clay
v. Wood, 170 Eng. Rep. 732 (N.P. 1803); Cruden v. Fentham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (N.P.
1798).
127E.g., Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824) (the pioneer case in the universal adoption of the contributory negligence rule in the United States). The Smith court,
citing Butterfield, stated that the plaintiff was required to show that he exercised ordinary
care in order to recover. For early New York cases recognizing the contributory negligence
rule, see Burdick v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (N.Y. 1848); Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill 282 (N.Y.
1843); Burckle v. New York Dry Dock Co., 2 N.Y. Super. 170 (1829). In New York, one of
the first jurisdictions to decide numerous railroad injury cases, the rule took hold during
the 1850's. For a history of the development of the contributory negligence rule in New
York, see Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. Rzv. 151
(1946).
128 The accidents of an earlier day had been pretty much occurrences between
neighbor and neighbor. As the nineteenth century progressed they became increasingly the casualties of the newer system.
2 HARmE & JAimEs 1197.
129 See SmEcrz ToPics 6; From Contributory to Comparative Negligence, supra note
125, at 143; Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 201

(1950).
1a0 It has, in fact, been called the "harshest doctrine known to the common law of
the nineteenth century," because it "throws the entire loss on the injured party, however
slight his negligent conduct, and at the same time relieves the negligent defendant altogether, however much he may have contributed to the injury." Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36 (1944). The plaintif's contributory negligence bars his recovery
from a negligent defendant. Generally, contributory negligence will not bar a plaintiff's
recovery if the defendant's wrongdoing was intentional; if the defendant's misconduct was
wilful, wanton, or reckless; if the defendant violated a statute designed to protect a class
of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; or if the defendant was engaged in an ultrahazardous activity. See 2 HiaPER & JAmEs 1211, 1213, 1216, 1227; PROSSER 425-26.
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"Last Clear Chance" doctrine, 1' 1 which was first applied in Davies v.
Mann. 1 32 The doctrine recognizes the right of a negligent plaintiff who
is in "helpless peril" to recover against another who knows of his peril
and is able to avoid the injury, but fails to do so. Its application in
many jurisdictions allows plaintiffs complete recovery, although apportionment between the parties would often be more appropriate. 33
Although still limited in some jurisdictions to instances of "helpless"
and "discovered" peril, most American courts allow recovery where
the plaintiff is "negligently inattentive" if the defendant discovers the
danger. 134 This doctrine has been criticized as perpetuating the same
inequity inherent in the contributory negligence rule, i.e., placing the
entire loss on one party where two have been negligent. 135
A second exception to the contributory negligence rule was created
by the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 1 36 in 1908.
The Act provides for compensation in all negligence actions by railroad
workers engaged in interstate commerce regardless of their contributory
negligence. Damages are diminished in proportion to the employee's
negligence. Similar results have obtained on the state level with the
131 For extensive analysis of the "Last Clear Chance" doctrine, see Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674, 700-08 (1934); James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional
Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938); Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53
HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1940). In New York, the doctrine was explicitly recognized in Kenyon
v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 5 Hun 479 (N.Y. 1875). For a history of the doctrine in
New York, see Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV.
151, 177-79 (1946).
132 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842). The court did not specifically enunciate the "Last
Clear Chance" doctrine, but spoke rather in terms of proximate cause. Attempts to justify
its existence on causation grounds have been criticized. See PRossER 427.
133 See Bohlen at 557.
134 From Contributory to Comparative Negligence at 146.
135 See SrLEcrED Topics 14-15; From Contributory to Comparative Negligence at 147;
Comment, Illinois Appellate Court Adopts Comparative Negligence Doctrine, 43 NoTaR
DAME LAW. 422, 424 (1968).
13645 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). The Act, in part, states:
[T]he fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee...
The Jones Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), incorporated by reference the apportionment provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Thus, under the Jones Act,
which is applicable to the negligence and wrongful death actions of maritime employees,
contributory negligence is not a defense. See Carter v. Schooner Pilgrim, 238 F.2d 702 (1st
Cir. 1956). The employee's damages are diminished in proportion to his negligence. See
Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
869 (1967). The Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970), applied the apportionment rule to the wrongful death actions of non-seamen. For further
discussion of these maritime statutes, see M. NoRms, THE LAW OF MA1RrTsE PERSONAL
INJURIES §§ 13, 134, 135 (2d ed. 1966).
In 1954, there were some forty statutes providing for apportionment of damages according -to fault in "successful operation" in the United States. SELErED Topxcs 4. The
federal government and more than twenty-five states were involved.
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enactment of Workmen's Compensation laws applicable to most industries. 37 The irony of this development is that it was industries, and
especially the railroads, which were the principal beneficiaries of the
contributory negligence rule at its inception, and the oft-cited reason
for its adoption. The fact that it is no longer available in this context
38
has prompted critics to call it an anachronism.
The severity of the rule is often tempered by juries which engage in
their own system of comparative negligence - the compromise verdict.
In the face of clear-cut instructions to apply the contributory negligence
rule, a jury will often allow a negligent plaintiff to recover some of his
damages by apportioning them according to the degree of his contribution to the injury and finding no contributory negligence. 3 9 In the
absence of a special verdict, which designates the proportion of guilt
attributable to each of the parties, 140 the general verdict may camouflage this comparative fault approach, 14' the result being that "juries
ignore the legal refinements of instructions and render verdicts based
on their own opinions as to 'justice' in the particular case."'1 42 The
practice of compromise verdicts for this reason has been called a corroding influence on attitudes about law and a "striking demonstration
that [the contributory negligence rule] is out of keeping with the prevailing and easily discernible sense of justice" of the community.,43
Not satisfied with the various ameliorations which have been engendered by the inequities of the contributory negligence rule, twelve
states have adopted the comparative fault approach. 144 Two types of
137 See, e.g., N.Y. WomrmEN's Comp. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965).
138 See, e.g., Creative Continuity, supra note 21, at 506-08; Comment, Judicial Adop-

tion of a ComparativeNegligence Rule in Illinois, 1967 ILL. L.F. 851, 853-54 [hereinafter
Comparative Negligence Rule in Illinois]; Comment, Illinois Appellate Court Adopts
Comparative Negligence Doctrine, 43 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 422, 424 (1968).
139 See Creative Continuity at 503; Knoeller, Review of the Wisconsin Comparative
Negligence Act: Suggested Amendment, 41 MAQ.L. REv. 397, 415 (1958); From Contributory to ComparativeNegligence at 144-45. For a study of the attitude of jurors toward the
contributory negligence rule, see Kalven, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REV.
897, 902-04 (1968).
140 A special verdict is employed by some states which have adopted a comparative
fault approach in negligence. Under this method, the jury submits separate determinations
as to the degree of the plaintiff's fault and the extent of his damages. The court then
makes the apportionment. See Bouchard, Apportionment of Damages Under Comparative
Negligence, 55 MAss. L.Q. 125, 129 (1970) [hereinafter Apportionment].
141 See From Contributory to Comparative Negligence at 171.
142 Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury, 43
A.B.A.J. 1005, 1006 (1957).
143 Creative Continuity at 507. See also Comparative Negligence Rule in Illinois,
supra note 188, at 855. "Approval of the covert violation of the present rule, in the interests of justice, suggests that perhaps the rule should be changed to conform to the
practice." Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested
Courts, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 4, 11 (1955).
144 Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne-
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apportionment under this system have been devised: "pure" and
"modified." Under the pure form, the plaintiff's recovery is diminished
according to the proportion of fault attributable to him. The modified
approach permits proportional recovery by a negligent plaintiff only if
his negligence is of a lesser degree than that of the defendant. 45 The
modified form has been criticized as a "misfit in a system designed to
distribute responsibility according to degrees of fault,"'146 and "in
practical effect a combination of contributory and comparative negligence."147
One of the principal controversies surrounding proposals for the
adoption of the comparative negligence approach involves its potential
effect on the administration of the court system. Proponents of the
change contend that it will produce: (1) faster settlements, because defendants would no longer be able to force dismissal on the ground
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, and (2) fewer jury trials,
because most demands for juries in negligence actions are made to
avoid the harshness of the contributory negligence rule.148 Opponents
argue that: (1) courts will be inundated with personal injury claims
braska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have adopted com-

parative negligence. See Apportionment, supra note 140, at 144 n.4. For comprehensive
discussions of the comparative negligence doctrine, see SmxcrED Topics 1-69, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence; Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 ConR-Eu L.Q. 333, 604 (1932); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March,
28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 804 (1950).
"The United States is virtually the last stronghold of contributory negligence."
SELECrED TopiCs 3.England adopted comparative negligence by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. Contributory negligence is no
longer a bar to the plaintiff's recovery; damages are apportioned as the court thinks just
and equitable.
145 See Apportionment at 127. Under the "slight versus gross negligence" variation,
damages are apportioned when the plaintiff's negligence is "slight," while the defendant's
negligence is "gross." For discussion of the modified approach, see From Contributory
to Comparative Negligence at 169.
14S Campbell, Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin, 1956
Wis. L. REv. 4, 21. The inconsistency of the modified approach has been illustrated by
this example: If the plaintiff is 40% negligent, he can recover 60% of his loss from a
single defendant. However, if two defendants, equally negligent, are involved, he can
recover from neither. Thus, the plaintiff's chance of recovery may depend upon the number of persons responsible for his injury. See Comparative Negligence Rule in Illinois
at 858-59.
147 ComparativeNegligence Rule in Illinois at 359.
148 See, e.g., Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested Courts, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 4, 11 (1955) ('England and Wisconsin have found
that a decrease in litigation resulted.'); Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken
to the Call of Progress,43 A.B.A.J. 127, 180, 149 (1957); Knoeller, Review of the Wisconsin
Comparative Negligence Act: Suggested Amendment, 41 MARQ. L. Rav. 397, 414 (1958).
For a reaction to the first article, see Harkavy, Comparative Negligence: The Reflections
of a Skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J. 1115 (1957). The author argues that the contributory negligence
rule is necessary as a disciplinary sanction in light of ever-increasing accident tolls. But
see Knoeller, supra, at 414.
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by plaintiffs who under the present rule would have no hope of recovery, and (2) litigation will be substantially complicated by requiring
juries to apportion. 149
The conclusions of a survey'5 0 conducted to determine the overall
impact of the Arkansas comparative negligence system may be helpful.
The researchers found that the comparative negligence rule encouraged
pretrial settlements and had no substantial effect on preference for jury
trials, but that it increased potential litigation and made the damages
51
issue more complex.'
The last statement by the New York Court of Appeals on the
subject of contributory negligence reflects deep dissatisfaction with that
doctrine. In 1971, in Rossman v. LaGrega,1 52 the Court, again per
Judge Bergan, took the opportunity to severely criticize the rule. The
Court stated:
The doctrine has, indeed, been long subjected to critical theoretical attack by commentators on the law of torts. Prosser has observed: "The history of the doctrine has been that of a chronic
invalid who will not die." He concluded: "With the gradual change
in social viewpoint, stressing the humanitarian desire to see injuries
compensated, the defense of contributory negligence has gradually
come to be looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts, and
its rigors have been quite extensively modified... ." The theories
justifying application of the doctrine were regarded by Prosser as
"the antique heritage of an older day.... 115
Significantly, the Court quoted with approval characterizations of contributory negligence as "'the harshest doctrine known to the common
law of the nineteenth century,' ,1'4 and a "'thoroughly unjust and illogical' "-I; doctrine. It pointedly observed that continued acceptance of
149 See, e.g., Body, Comparative Negligence: The Views of a Trial Lawyer, 44 A.B.A.J.
346 (1958); LaBrum, Congested Trial Calendars:It's About Time to Do Something About
Them, 43 A.BA.J. 311, 314 (1957). The arguments are marshalled in Rosenberg, ComparativeNegligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89, 91-93

(1959).
150Oosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey,
13 ARK. L. R v. 89 (1959). Reports were obtained from judges and lawyers involved in
negligence litigation in Arkansas before and after the adoption of comparative negligence.
1511d. at 108. For further appraisal of the arguments, see From Contributory to
Comparative Negligence at 160-74.
15228 N.Y.2d 300, 270 N.E.2d 313, 321 N.YS2d 588 (1971) (7-0).
1i3 Id. at 306, 270 N.E.2d at 316, 321 N.YS.2d at 593, quoting PRossER, THE LAW oF
ToRTs 428 (3d ed. 1964).
154 Id. at 307, 270 N.E.2d at 316, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 594, quoting Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36 (1944).
155 Id., 270 N.E.2d at 317, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 594, quoting Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Gao. L.J. 674, 709 (1934).
The doctrine of contributory negligence is not just. The defendant should not
be made to bear the burden of the plaintiff's misconduct. Nor should he go scot-
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the contributory negligence rule requires reconciliation to " 'inconsistent and irreconcilable cases.' "156 In unanimously holding that the issue
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence should not be decided as a matter of law, the Court concluded: "At least we ought not extend the
157
perimeters of this unsatisfactory doctrine wider than we need to."'

This criticism of the contributory negligence rule by the Court of
Appeals culminated in Dole, a further indication of judicial dissatisfaction with that archaic doctrine and a major step toward the adoption
of full comparative negligence in New York. Importantly, one court
has offered the following analysis:
It is the opinion of this Court that the epic-making Dole decision is
the first important step toward the judicial re-evaluation and revision of the hard and fast rule of law which precludes a plaintiff
who is guilty of any negligence from recovering damages for his
injuries. True comparative negligence which determines plaintiffs
recovery by a qualitative and quantitative measure of responsibility, a procedure valid in many states of the Union, is the most
equitable method of determining the rights of the parties in a negligence cause of action. It is readily apparent from a study of the
opinion of the Court in the Dole case that an extension of this
philosophy in favor of a plaintiff who to some degree is guilty of
negligence would not bar his right of recovery. 158
Since contributory negligence is a judicially-created doctrine, 59
the Court of Appeals need not wait for the Legislature to act: it may
adopt a comparative fault system on its own initiative. 160
free. In an ideal system the defendant would be compelled to shoulder that part
of the loss which was due to his negligence. The plaintiff would bear that portion which was referable to his own misconduct.
Lowndes, supra, at 708.
156 28 N.Y.2d at 808, 270 NE.2d at 317, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 595, quoting 34 N.C.L. REv.
187, 141 (1955).
157 Id., 270 N.E.2d at 317, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
158Yarish v. Dowling, 70 Misc. 2d 467, 469, 333 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1972) (mem.). "[A]nalysis of Dole and Kelly suggests that a view of contributory
negligence which makes it an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery cannot survive."
Sorrentino v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 1808, 1310 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
159 The contributory negligence rule has found its way into New York statutes
(N. Y. ESr., PowERs 8, TRusrs LAw §§ 5-4.2 & 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967)), but these statutes may fairly be interpreted as legislative recognition of the rule rather than legislative mandate for its continued application.
160 See Loni v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 265 n.5, 438 P.2d 393, 897 n.5 (1968); Maki
v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967), rev'd, 40 I1. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445
(1968). Cf. Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 856, 278 NYE.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1972), noted in 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 588 (1972) (liberalizing the forum non conveniens
doctrine); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 484, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)
(modifying the intrafamily immunity doctrine); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 NX.2d
3, 168 N.YS.2d 8 (1957) (abolishing the charitable immunity doctrine). But see Bissen v.
Fujii, 51 Hawaii 636, 466 P.2d 429 (1970); Peterson v. Culp, 255 Ore. 269, 465 P.2d 876
(1970); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 518 (1970). Favorable
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The revolution that is Dole is part of a pattern of judicial activity
aimed at the elimination of archaic common-law rules developed in
olden times and applied too strictly and for too long. Many of these
doctrines - e.g., the charitable immunity rule, the intrafamily immunity rule, the active-passive dichotomy, and, particularly, the contributory negligence rule - have had the effect of preventing recovery
and recovery over from wrongdoers who had been able to invoke a
kind of talismanic immunity from liability. Thus, the Court has liberalized the bases for recovery and further fused responsibility with fault.
Only the contributory negligence rule remains to be abrogated.
The reasonableness of an apportionment system propels us toward
a comparative negligence rule, but the likelihood that it will aggravate
the acute problem of court congestion acts as a restraint. Legislative
adoption of a no-fault automobile insurance plan - increasingly likely
- would reduce court congestion and create an atmosphere more conducive to the adoption of a comparative negligence system. In a state
moving toward such a no-fault system, the equitable comparative
negligence rule should certainly prevail.
Conclusion
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. creates a system of comparative negligence among defendants, a system which is realistic and fair. The
commentary on the issue includes PaossER 434; Creative Continuity; Comparative Negligence Rule in Illinois at 556-57. For a symposium on whether the change to a rule of
comparative negligence should be made by the judiciary or the legislature, see 21 VAND.
L. REy. 889 et seq.
Some courts have adopted a form of comparative negligence. The leading example is Tennessee with its judicially created doctrine of remote contributory
negence.... The essential difference between the Tennessee rule and ordinary
comparative negligence is that in the latter, damages are mitigated or diminished
in accordance with the relative degrees of negligence of the parties, while in the
former, they are diminished in accordance with the relative closeness of the
causal connection....
Georgia's comparative negligence . . . statute grew out of language in the
opinions of previous decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court....
Finally, the various recognized exceptions- such as that of intentional, wilful, and wanton, or gross misconduct, and especially that of last clear chance were all judicially created.
Wade, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. Rrv. 938-40 (1968). Georgia's codified
judicial rule was "subsequently judicially broadened into a general apportionment rule."
Comparative Negligence Rule in Illinois at 353 n.17. Georgia courts broadly interpreted
a statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1972), providing for apportionment in railroad negligence actions.
There appears to be no compelling reason why the contributory negligence rule
could not be judicially abrogated. In 1968, Professor Robert Keeton concluded:
[In the last ten years], [m]ore than half of the state courts of last resort have
contributed to a total of more than ninety overruling decisions on more than
thirty separate rules of tort law. It is becoming an accepted principle that courts
should take a more active role in reforming outmoded tort law...
Keeton, Comment on Maid v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 906, 914-15 (1968).
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"[r]ight to apportionment of liability or to full indemnity, . . . as

among parties involved together in causing damage by negligence, [is
to] rest on relative responsibility and [is] to be determined on the
facts." 161 Dole eliminates the active-passive test for indemnification and
supersedes in part the contribution statute, CPLR 1401. A Dole claim
can be made by impleader, cross-claim, counterclaim, or separate indemnity action. In the interest of economical judicial administration,
damages should be apportioned among all participants in a single
action. A Dole claim is available in the negligence and breach of warranty areas and apparently in the strict liability area. Additionally, it
may even be extended to intentional torts. Dole will probably be retroactive. Most significantly, Dole signals deep dissatisfaction with the
Draconian contributory negligence rule and moves New York inexorably toward the adoption of full comparative negligence.
161 Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S2d
382, 391-92 (1972).

